Where Fun Comes to Die

Torture may be bad. It may be inefficient, it may be politically unpopular, it may be morally wrong. Nations having a policy of torture, however – that may be good for both the torturer and the torturee.

Imagine the following hypothetical: you are a spy with valuable state secrets. You get captured. You know you will give up these state secrets, and with very dire consequences (e.g. the injury or death of thousands of people). Would you rather be tricked into divulging these secrets, or tortured? An informal poll suggested that most people would rather be tricked. Why? Because torture is painful and they did not want to endure the pain of torture. Fair enough.

Follow up question: when you return home, would you tell your superiors that you were tricked or tortured? Disclosing state secrets is serious business. Because there is a huge financial incentive to sell state secrets, your home country officials will naturally be suspicious. How can you prove that you disclosed the secrets against your will? Wouldn’t it be just as likely that you sold the secrets and lied about being tricked? If you end up being tortured, on the other hand, you can console yourself with the thought that the more horrible the torture, the more evidence there is that you disclosed the secrets against your will. Torture may be painful, but death by a firing squad could be worse.

Even if a nation is morally opposed to torture, having a policy of torture can actually encourage efficient disclosure. Spies will be reluctant to disclose secrets if it means death for treason. When a nation has a policy of torture, spies can sell secrets, give themselves a black eye and some burn marks, and have a relatively credible lie about being tortured. In a nation that is categorically opposed to torture, spies would not have this option so the cost of disclosure (firing squad) would be greater. Of course, a spy could always defect or otherwise not return to his home country, but as would-be mob informants know, living life as a known rat can be dangerous. In any case, the higher the cost of disclosure, the more spies will fight to keep secrets and the more aggressive the capturing country will need to be to elicit secrets. Giving people the credible excuse of torture decreases the possible costs of disclosure.

Torturees might like the option/excuse of torture so they could reveal state secrets when it suits them. Having torturees freer to divulge secrets is better for the capturing country because they could get more secrets faster. Trickery, torture, why not at least have options? Even if the country does not torture or does not torture frequently, having a policy of torture benefits both the torturer and the torturee.